
CorporateTaiwan2023A Taiwanese investor — a private investment vehicle backed by a publicly-listed Taiwanese conglomerate — holding a 35% minority stake in a Vietnamese consumer-products company. The Vietnamese company had grown rapidly to annual revenue of around USD 50M and was preparing for a possible Hanoi listing within three years. The Taiwanese investor's stake was acquired in 2019 for USD 8M, with shareholder protections drafted carefully into the Investment Agreement.
In early 2023, the Vietnamese majority shareholders proposed a 'restructuring' transaction to be approved at an extraordinary shareholders' meeting scheduled for three weeks later. The proposed transaction: the Vietnamese company would acquire two affiliated companies (also majority-owned by the Vietnamese majority shareholders) at valuations that, on the Taiwanese investor's preliminary review, appeared substantially above market.
The transaction would be funded through: (1) issuance of new shares, diluting the Taiwanese investor's 35% stake to approximately 22%; and (2) cash from the Vietnamese company's reserves, reducing dividend capacity for the next two years. If the transaction proceeded as proposed, the Taiwanese investor estimated it would suffer approximately USD 2.5M in dilution loss plus a multi-year delay in dividend payments. More fundamentally, the deal would shift control of the company further toward the Vietnamese majority and reduce the Taiwanese investor's ability to influence the future listing strategy.
The Investment Agreement included a related-party-transaction clause requiring approval by 75% of shares — meaning the Taiwanese investor's 35% gave it a clear blocking right. The Vietnamese majority shareholders were aware of this provision and were proposing to characterise the transaction as 'ordinary course' to avoid the supermajority requirement.
We needed to prevent the transaction from proceeding while engaging in negotiated resolution. The first step was an immediate filing for emergency court injunction at the competent Provincial People's Court, supported by:
(1) the Investment Agreement's related-party-transaction provisions and the proposed transaction's clear status as related-party;
(2) preliminary independent valuation evidence suggesting the proposed acquisition prices exceeded fair market by approximately 30-40%;
(3) procedural defects in the convening notice for the extraordinary shareholders' meeting (insufficient detail about the transactions to be voted on under Article 142 of the Enterprise Law).
The court granted the injunction within nine days, halting the shareholders' meeting and the proposed transaction. The Vietnamese majority shareholders' response was immediate: a request for negotiation. We agreed but on three conditions: (1) the injunction would remain in place during negotiations; (2) the Vietnamese majority would commission an independent valuation from a firm acceptable to both sides; (3) any restructured transaction would be subject to the Investment Agreement's supermajority requirement.
The independent valuation came in approximately 35% below the originally proposed prices. With this baseline, we negotiated a restructured transaction: smaller acquisition (only one of the two affiliated companies), at fair-market price, with the consideration paid in shares from a portion of the Vietnamese majority's holding rather than new issuance. This eliminated dilution of the Taiwanese investor's stake and maintained dividend capacity.
The restructured transaction was approved at a properly-convened shareholders' meeting with the Taiwanese investor's affirmative vote. The Taiwanese investor maintained its 35% stake and its blocking-right protection. The Vietnamese company subsequently performed strongly through 2024, and as of late 2024 was on track for a 2026 Hanoi listing. The Taiwanese investor's stake has appreciated approximately 80% from its 2019 acquisition cost based on third-party valuation references.
The negotiated outcome preserved the working relationship between the shareholders. Subsequent governance has been notably more careful, with related-party transactions properly identified and submitted for supermajority approval as a matter of routine.
Investment Agreements drafted carefully at the time of investment are the backbone of minority-shareholder protection in Vietnam. The related-party-transaction supermajority provision in this matter was negotiated in 2019 over considerable resistance — and four years later, it was the entire basis of a successful intervention. Speed matters: the three-week window before the proposed shareholders' meeting was tight but sufficient. Filing the emergency injunction within ten days of awareness of the transaction was the difference between negotiating from strength and negotiating from a position of fait accompli.
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